Indiana Law Journal
Volume 91

Issue 4

Article 10

Summer 2016

Terra Firma as Open Seas: Interpreting Kiobel in the Failed State
Context
Drew F. Waldbeser
Indiana University Maurer School of Law, dwaldbes@indiana.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, International Law Commons, Jurisdiction Commons, and
the Torts Commons

Recommended Citation
Waldbeser, Drew F. (2016) "Terra Firma as Open Seas: Interpreting Kiobel in the Failed State Context,"
Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 91 : Iss. 4 , Article 10.
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol91/iss4/10

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by
the Law School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Indiana Law
Journal by an authorized editor of Digital Repository @
Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
rvaughan@indiana.edu.

Terra Firma as Open Seas: Interpreting Kiobel in the Failed
State Context
DREW F. WALDBESER*
INTRODUCTION
Modern human rights violations are often inextricably intertwined with failed
states. Although collapsed or delegitimized countries do not have a monopoly on
horrific violations, they certainly contribute disproportionately.1 For example, South
Sudan, 2014’s most fragile country according to the Fund for Peace,2 is currently
trapped in a violent civil war.3 Citizens of South Sudan have been victims of
gruesome massacres, torture, and other war crimes.4 Militants on both sides of the
conflict have targeted civilians.5 Further, much of the violence against civilians
appears to have been ethnically motivated.6 Unfortunately, because of the lack of
legitimate legal infrastructure, these victims have essentially no chance of obtaining
justice through domestic institutions.7 As such, their best hope of obtaining any kind
of remedy lies with the international community. For several decades, the Alien Tort
Statute (ATS) has served as one of the most promising pathways for foreign plaintiffs
to bring tort claims alleging foreign human rights violations in U.S. courts.8

* J.D. candidate, 2016, Indiana University Maurer School of Law; B.A., 2012, Thomas
Edison State University. Special thanks to my family, without whom I would not be where I
am. Particular thanks also to Professor Alfred Aman, who provided invaluable assistance
during topic selection and research. Finally, my earnest thanks to the members of the Indiana
Law Journal for their careful and thorough editing. All glory to God.
1. See Gerald B. Helman & Steven R. Ratner, Saving Failed States, FOREIGN POL’Y,
Winter 1992–93, at 3, 8, 18–20.
2. THE FUND FOR PEACE, FRAGILE STATES INDEX 2014, at 4 (2014), available at
http://library.fundforpeace.org/library/cfsir1423-fragilestatesindex2014-06d.pdf [https://perma.cc
/9PEG-TJJW]. The Index ranks states based on a variety of indicators: demographic pressures,
refugees, uneven economic development, group grievance, human flight and brain drain,
poverty and economic decline, state legitimacy, public services, human rights and rule of law,
security apparatus, factionalized elites, and external intervention. Id. at 10.
3. Id. at 16.
4. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SOUTH SUDAN’S NEW WAR 23, 81–83 (2014), available at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/southsudan0814_ForUpload.pdf [https://perma.cc
/B9HV-WSD5].
5. See, e.g., id. at 57–61, 82; UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
SUDAN, UNITED NATIONS, CONFLICT IN SOUTH SUDAN: A HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 17 (2014),
available at http://unmiss.unmissions.org/Portals/unmiss/Human%20Rights%20Reports
/UNMISS%20Conflict%20in%20South%20Sudan%20-%20A%20Human%20Rights%20Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3U8C-E3GB].
6. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN, UNITED
NATIONS, supra note 5, at 17.
7. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 4, at 86–89.
8. See generally BETH STEPHENS, JUDITH CHOMSKY, JENNIFER GREEN, PAUL HOFFMAN &
MICHAEL RATNER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS (Martinus
Nijhoff 2d ed. 2008) (1996).
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However, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co.9 has made obtaining redress for human rights violations in U.S.
federal courts much more difficult.10 The Supreme Court originally granted certiorari
in Kiobel to examine whether corporations could be held liable under the ATS.11
Nevertheless, the Court ultimately held that the ATS is presumed to not apply
extraterritorially,12 dramatically limiting potential uses of the statute to provide
remedies for transnational human rights violations. In coming to this conclusion, the
Court delved deeply into Congress’s intent in passing the ATS.13 The Court found
only three settings where Congress intended the ATS to apply: “violation of safe
conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.”14 Surprisingly, the
Court did not explicitly rule on the original question of whether corporations can be
held liable under the ATS.15 Rather, the majority opinion included a terse paragraph
explaining that, in order to overcome the presumption against extraterritorial
application, the claims must “touch and concern” the United States with “sufficient
force.”16
What constitutes “sufficient force” remains largely unclear. Prior to Kiobel, there
was disagreement over whether “foreign-cubed” actions—actions arising in a foreign
territory among two foreign parties—should be allowed. Many commentators
believe that Kiobel was a “death knell for transnational human rights actions in U.S.
federal courts.”17 “Foreign-cubed” actions were seemingly rejected by the Court, and
even the efficacy of “foreign-squared” actions—where one of the parties involved is
American or the harm occurred on U.S. soil—has been questioned by some
commentators.18

9. 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
10. Curtis A. Bradley, Supreme Court Holds That Alien Tort Statute Does Not Apply to
Conduct in Foreign Countries, AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L.: ASIL INSIGHTS (Apr. 18, 2013),
http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/17/issue/12/supreme-court-holds-alien-tort-statute-does
-not-apply-conduct-foreign [https://perma.cc/49W7-GTK2].
11. Anton Metlitsky, The Alien Tort Statute, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of
Federal-Common-Law Causes of Action, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 53, 63 (2013).
12. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
13. Id. at 1665.
14. Id. at 1666.
15. Joel Slawotsky, Are Financial Institutions Liable for Financial Crime Under the Alien
Tort Statute?, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 957, 960 n.10 (2013). However, at least one court has
claimed implicit acceptance of the idea of corporate liability under the ATS exists in the Kiobel
decision. See In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 15 F. Supp. 3d 454, 460 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
16. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
17. Matteo M. Winkler, What Remains of the Alien Tort Statute After Kiobel?, 39 N.C. J.
INT’L L. & COM. REG. 171, 172 (2013); see also JOHN GERARD RUGGIE, JUST BUSINESS:
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 196 (2013); Louise Weinberg, What We
Don’t Talk About When We Talk About Extraterritoriality: Kiobel and the Conflict of Laws,
99 CORNELL L. REV. 1471, 1472 (2014); Roger Alford, Kiobel Insta-Symposium: The Death
of the ATS and the Rise of Transnational Tort Litigation, OPINIO JURIS (Apr. 17, 2013, 5:48 PM),
http://opiniojuris.org/2013/04/17/kiobel-instthe-death-of-the-ats-and-the-rise-of-transnational
-tort-litigation/ [https://perma.cc/2ZQ3-BC73].
18. See, e.g., Donald Childress, Kiobel Commentary: An ATS Answer with Many
Questions (and the Possibility of a Brave New World of Transnational Litigation),
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This Note will ultimately argue that, despite the expansive language in Kiobel, the
Court’s reasoning does not necessarily foreclose all “foreign-cubed” claims. Suits
alleging human rights violations originating from conduct that took place in failed
states avoid the concerns the Court emphasized in Kiobel. The Court should allow
jurisdiction for human rights offenses in failed states, despite their “foreign-cubed”
nature, because the already existing rationale for allowing jurisdiction for
international piracy offenses is highly analogous.
Part I of this Note explores the ATS jurisprudence leading up to and including
Kiobel. Besides exploring the tensions and policy interests courts are grappling with,
Part I also summarizes the various opinions in Kiobel. Part II investigates the concept
of piracy as understood in ATS jurisprudence and argues that the concept can be
analogized to human rights violations in failed states. Part III explains why extending
jurisdiction to human rights claims in failed states avoids both the comity and foreign
policy concerns the Court emphasized in Kiobel. Finally, Part IV details the strong
interests the United States has in allowing jurisdiction in this limited context and
discusses the efficacy of the ATS as a means of redress.
I. THE HISTORICAL AND JURISPRUDENTIAL CONTEXT OF THE KIOBEL DECISION
The ATS was passed in 1789 as part of the Judiciary Act.19 The statute reads, in
full: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien
for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States.” 20 Because the statute is so short and opaque, it presents many conceptual
and interpretational problems.21 The lack of any specified geographical nexus for
jurisdiction22 and the omission of any explicit causes of action are particularly
noteworthy.23 Unfortunately, the statute’s legislative history also yields little
clarity.24 There does not appear to be any record of congressional debates over the
bill.25 Further, or perhaps because of the statute’s vagueness, the ATS has lain largely

SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 18, 2013, 5:03 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/04/kiobel
-commentary-an-ats-answer-with-many-questions-and-the-possibility-of-a-brave-new-world
-of-transnational-litigation/ [https://perma.cc/5GPN-JCLQ]. But see Al Shimari v. CACI
Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516 (4th Cir. 2014) (finding that Kiobel did not foreclose
jurisdiction over claims against private military contractors from the United States by Iraqi
nationals alleging that they were tortured while imprisoned by U.S. forces); Oona Hathaway,
Kiobel Commentary: The Door Remains Open to “Foreign Squared” Cases, SCOTUSBLOG
(Apr. 18, 2013, 4:27 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/04/kiobel-commentary-the-door
-remains-open-to-foreign-squared-cases/ [https://perma.cc/6UR2-4EUP].
19. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1663.
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
21. See Winkler, supra note 17, at 174–75 (citing Andrew J. Wilson, Beyond Unocal:
Conceptual Problems in Using International Norms to Hold Transnational Corporations
Liable Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, in TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 43 (Olivier De Schutter ed., 2006)).
22. Id. at 175.
23. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1663.
24. IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (“[N]o one seems to know
whence [the ATS] came.”).
25. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 812 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J.,

1496

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 91:1493

unused for most of its lifetime. In fact, prior to the modern rebirth of the ATS in the
latter half of the twentieth century, the statute had only been invoked in three cases,
none of which discussed the ATS or its implications in any great depth.26 These early
cases mostly involved “piracy or war prize actions.”27
A. The Rediscovery of the ATS
Despite the ATS’s uneventful history, the statute blossomed into prominence with
the Second Circuit’s decision in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.28 Notably, Filartiga
involved a “foreign-cubed” action: a Paraguayan citizen sued a Paraguayan official
for torture that occurred in Paraguay.29 The Second Circuit’s decision emphasized
the international community’s uniform agreement that torture violates the law of
nations in finding that the ATS provided jurisdiction.30 As the court explained: “[F]or
purposes of civil liability, the torturer has become—like the pirate and slave trader
before him—hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind.”31
Filartiga introduced the ATS as a premier mechanism for providing redress for
international human rights violations.32 Post-Filartiga, but pre-Kiobel, many courts
had no qualms with applying the ATS extraterritorially.33 Further, in Kadic v.
Karadzic, the Second Circuit held that the ATS could be used to bring suits against
nonstate actors, rather than merely persons acting under color of state law.34 In short,
the Second Circuit was leading the charge to revitalize the ATS for a new, globalizing
world.

concurring).
26. See O’Reilly de Camara v. Brooke, 209 U.S. 45, 52 (1908) (finding potential
jurisdiction under the ATS, but holding that the actions being complained of had been ratified
by the executive, congressional, and treaty-making powers, so no tort occurred); Bolchos v.
Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810, 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (finding that the statute provided jurisdiction for a
claim involving a treaty of the United States); Moxon v. The Fanny, 17 F. Cas. 942, 948 (D.
Pa. 1793) (holding that the statute did not apply to the suit based on an act of piracy because
the action was not for a tort only).
27. Ivan Poullaos, Note, The Nature of the Beast: Using the Alien Tort Claims Act To
Combat International Human Rights Violations, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 327, 333 (2002).
28. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
29. Id. at 878.
30. Id. at 881.
31. Id. at 890.
32. Ingrid Wuerth, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.: The Supreme Court and the
Alien Tort Statute, 107 AM. J. INT’L. L. 601, 601 (2013).
33. See, e.g., Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 2011)
(finding jurisdiction existed for a claim brought by Liberian plaintiffs against a U.S. company
for hazardous child labor which the company utilized in Liberia); Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,
654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (finding jurisdiction existed for a claim brought by Indonesian
plaintiffs against a U.S. company for conduct which occurred in Indonesia); Kadic v. Karadzic,
70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding jurisdiction existed for a claim brought by Bosnian
plaintiffs against a Bosnian defendant for a genocidal campaign allegedly carried out in
Bosnia).
34. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239.
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In Sosa v. Alvarez–Machain, the Supreme Court addressed the ATS’s
renaissance.35 Sosa involved an action brought partially under the ATS by a plaintiff
alleging that U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration agents hired Mexican nationals
to kidnap the plaintiff and bring him to the United States where he could be arrested
and tried for crimes.36 In attempting to make sense of the newly popularized ATS,
Justice Breyer’s majority opinion explained that there were three recognized
violations of the law of nations at the time the ATS was passed: “violation of safe
conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.”37 The Court
rejected the idea that the ATS was passed without having an enforceable purpose,
but reasoned that the purpose appeared to be limited to the three aforementioned
violations of the law of nations.38 In short, the majority held that “courts should
require any claim based on the present-day law of nations to rest on a norm of
international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity
comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms we have recognized.”39
The Sosa majority also addressed the foreign policy implications of adopting an
unrestrained interpretation of the ATS, foreshadowing a prominent theme in Kiobel.
The opinion emphasized the Court’s wariness to open the door for federal courts to
“consider suits under rules that would go so far as to claim a limit on the power of
foreign governments over their own citizens, and to hold that a foreign government
or its agent has transgressed those limits.”40 In short, Sosa limited the potential
universe of ATS claims, but clearly left the door open for suits brought alleging
human rights violations that were sufficiently analogous to the historical violations
of the law of nations.
After Sosa, courts and commentators were left to debate which, if any, modern
day human rights violations were sufficiently specific and subject to universal
condemnation to fall under the ATS. Of the three original contexts for the ATS’s
application the Court mentioned, piracy is the most comparable to modern human
rights concerns.41 Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion in Sosa reflected this
understanding by implying that piracy represents the benchmark for modern
applications of the ATS.42

35. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
36. Id. at 697–98.
37. Id. at 715.
38. Id. at 719–20.
39. Id. at 725. The Court further held that the requirements of universality and specificity
were not met in the case before them. Id. The Court also took care to clarify that universality
and specificity were not necessarily the only requirements. Id. at 732–33. One other potential
limiting principle the Court highlighted was exhaustion: a requirement that the claimant had
exhausted all available remedies in the domestic court system. Id. at 733 n.21.
40. Id. at 727.
41. Eugene Kontorovich, Implementing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: What Piracy Reveals
About the Limits of the Alien Tort Statute, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 111, 132 (2004).
Additionally, the Sosa opinion cited two piracy cases as historical examples of ATS
application. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 720. Previous ATS cases were almost entirely focused on piracy
or war prize actions. See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text.
42. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 760–62 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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Despite the Supreme Court’s obvious desire in Sosa to contain the ATS, the
decision also seems to manifest an understanding that the growing consensus in the
international community over the wrongfulness of certain actions deserves, if
nothing else, attention.43 Considering the growth and development of the modern
conception of human rights over the past few decades, perhaps this is unsurprising.44
As globalization draws the world together and transforms the way that human rights
are perceived and articulated, the international community’s collaboration becomes
increasingly integral to addressing violations.45
B. The Supreme Court Reexamines the ATS in Kiobel
If Filartiga46 marked the beginning of a new age of ATS litigation, Kiobel47 seems
to represent a dramatic shift in the treatment of the ATS. In retrospect, perhaps the
change in course was predictable. The Court’s 2010 decision in Morrison v. National
Australia Bank Ltd.48 was openly hostile to extraterritorial claims, albeit in the
antitrust context.49 Two years later, in 2012, Kiobel arrived at the Supreme Court.
Like Filartiga, Kiobel involved a “foreign-cubed” case. The plaintiffs in Kiobel were
Nigerian citizens who alleged that the Royal Dutch Petroleum Company had aided
Nigerian officials in conducting a reign of terror against individuals protesting the
environmental consequences of the defendant’s oil production activities.50 Initially,
the Supreme Court heard arguments on whether corporations could be held liable
under the ATS.51 However, the Court immediately requested additional briefing and
argument on the issue of whether the ATS should grant jurisdiction for torts arising
from conduct which occurred in foreign nations.52 In its eventual decision, the Court
held that the ATS was subject to a presumption against extraterritorial application
and that the presumption had not been overcome in the present case.53 Although the
justices disagreed about the specific reasoning, all agreed on the ultimate outcome.54

43. See id. at 729–30, 732–38.
44. See SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY, 179–80 (2010).
45. See Allison Brysk, Introduction to GLOBALIZATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 2–4
(Allison Brysk ed., 2002).
46. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
47. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
48. 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
49. In Morrison, the Court refused to allow foreign plaintiffs to sue foreign and American
defendants for alleged misconduct involving misrepresentations made about the value of
certain mortgage-servicing rights. Id. at 251–52. The Court emphasized that a federal antitrust
statute should be presumed not to apply extraterritorially and rejected the Second Circuit’s
more liberal test for application of the statute. Id. at 255, 261. Rather, the Court reasoned,
because the security involved was not listed on an American stock exchange, and all aspects
of the purchases occurred outside the United States, the statute did not apply. Id. at 273.
50. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1662.
51. Winkler, supra note 17, at 183.
52. Id.
53. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
54. Id. at 1669–70.
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Chief Justice Roberts wrote the Court’s opinion.55 The opinion quoted Morrison’s
language to establish that “[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an
extraterritorial application, it has none.”56 The presumption was justified as a means
to avoid international discord stemming from foreign policy complications that
extraterritorial application might create.57 The opinion referenced Sosa repeatedly to
support the idea that applications of the ATS must be constrained so as to limit
infringement on foreign policy decisions made by the other branches.58 According to
Roberts, the “danger of unwarranted judicial interference in the conduct of foreign
policy” is “all the more pressing when the question is whether a cause of action under
the ATS reaches conduct within the territory of another sovereign.”59
After establishing the presumption’s existence, Roberts’s opinion focused on
whether the “text, history, and purposes of the ATS” provide a clear indication of
extraterritoriality.60 Here, Roberts followed the Sosa Court in pointing out the three
principal offenses against the law of nations that existed at the passage of the ATS.61
The Chief Justice argued that violations of safe conducts and infringements on the
rights of ambassadors are not necessarily extraterritorial offenses and thus provide
no basis to rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality.62
Piracy, however, is the classic example of a nonterritorial offense. Roberts
recognized this, even admitting that the high seas are generally treated the same as
foreign jurisdictions when applying a presumption against extraterritorial
application.63 However, he distinguished piracy from other extraterritorial conduct
by explaining that allowing jurisdiction for piracy “does not typically impose the
sovereign will of the United States onto conduct occurring within the territorial
jurisdiction of another sovereign, and therefore carries less direct foreign policy
consequences.”64 Because pirates operated outside of recognized jurisdictions, they
were fair game for every nation and, perhaps, a sui generis category for jurisdictional
purposes.65 After emphasizing that the ATS was passed to avoid diplomatic strife,66

55. Id. at 1662. Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito joined. As outlined below,
Justice Kennedy wrote a separate concurrence. Justice Alito also wrote a separate concurrence,
joined by Justice Thomas, explaining that he would have gone even further than the Court’s
opinion: bar ATS actions unless the “domestic conduct is sufficient to violate an international
law norm that satisfies Sosa’s requirements of definiteness and acceptance among civilized
nations.” Id. at 1670 (Alito, J., concurring).
56. Id. at 1664 (quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010)).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1664–65.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1665.
61. Id. at 1666.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1667.
64. Id.
65. Id. Indeed, Justice Roberts is not alone in believing that piracy is afforded universal
jurisdiction for unique reasons. See Kontorovich, supra note 41, at 153–56.
66. Apparently, prior to the ATS’s passage, there was a controversy involving a French
official who was insulted and physically threatened by another French citizen in Philadelphia.
Although it appears the offender was brought to justice, the French official requested that
Congress pass a statute protecting the rights of foreign officials on U.S. soil. See Curtis A.
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Roberts asserted that providing a cause of action for conduct occurring in another
sovereign’s territory would generate exactly that kind of strife.67
The opinion’s concluding paragraph is terse and indeterminate. After reminding
the reader that all the conduct alleged in the case was foreign, Roberts asserted that
“where the claims touch and concern the territory of the United States, they must do
so with sufficient force” to rebut the presumption.68 Other than holding that “mere
corporate presence” is not enough,69 the opinion provides no other explanation for
when, if ever, the presumption would be rebutted.
In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy attempted to downplay the scope of the
Court’s decision and the reach of its reasoning.70 After recognizing that “a number
of significant questions” remain unanswered, Kennedy hints that the application of
the presumption against extraterritorial application might be different in cases
involving serious violations of international law principles not covered by the
“reasoning and holding of [the] case.”71
Justice Breyer’s concurrence provides a broader, more nuanced perspective on
how the presumption against extraterritoriality might be rebutted.72 Rather than
creating a presumption against extraterritorial application, Breyer would find
jurisdiction when
(1) the alleged tort occurs on American soil, (2) the defendant is an
American national, or (3) the defendant’s conduct substantially and
adversely affects an important American national interest, and that
includes a distinct interest in preventing the United States from becoming
a safe harbor (free of civil as well as criminal liability) for a torturer or
other common enemy of mankind.73
Breyer framed his concurrence around the Court’s rationale in Sosa. First, he
reiterated the Sosa Court’s finding that only claims alleging violations of
international norms of universal acceptance and specificity equivalent to the three
original violations of the law of nations could be brought under the ATS.74 Then,
presumably in response to Roberts’s clear concern about disrupting foreign policy
and comity, Breyer contended that additional requirements of exhaustion of domestic
remedies and respect for the sovereign rights of other nations might apply.75
According to Breyer, however, the real question guiding application of the ATS
is: “Who are today’s pirates?”76 He argued that the Court’s opinion was premised on
the belief that Congress normally legislates regarding domestic matters, but asserted

Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article III, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 587, 638–41 (2002) (arguing,
however, that this incident was not the “genesis of the Alien Tort Statute”).
67. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1666–69.
68. Id. at 1669.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
71. Id.
72. The concurrence was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan.
73. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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that the ATS was enacted with foreign conduct in mind—specifically, piracy.77
Breyer challenged Roberts’s attempt to distinguish piracy from modern human rights
violations by pointing out that, despite piracy’s nexus to the high seas, international
law treats ships like small, sovereign slices of their homeland.78 In other words,
piracy prosecutions did involve applying U.S. law to conduct occurring within the
sovereign jurisdiction of another state. Further, although Roberts claimed that
allowing jurisdiction for piracy resulted in less danger of interfering with U.S.
foreign policy than allowing jurisdiction for conduct occurring on land, Breyer gave
several examples of piracy’s impact on foreign relations.79 In answer to his own
question, Breyer concludes that “today’s pirates include torturers and perpetrators of
genocide. And today, like the pirates of old, they are ‘fair game’ where they are
found.”80
C. Reconciling Kiobel with Sosa, Filartiga, and the Modern, Globalizing World
The Kiobel decision leaves much unresolved.81 It uses sweeping language in
creating a presumption against application of the ATS that will undoubtedly bar
claims in many, if not most, circumstances. However, the decision is perhaps more
interesting for what it leaves unaddressed. First, the decision completely ignores the
original issue on appeal—whether corporations are subject to liability under the ATS.82
Further, the barebones “touch and concern” paragraph gives little indication of whether
suits involving either domestic conduct or one domestic party—the aforementioned
“foreign-squared” suits83—might still be valid. Seemingly, Kiobel does not mean that
all extraterritorial claims are barred as a matter of course—Justices Alito and Thomas
alone appeared to suggest that interpretation in their concurrence.84 Justice Breyer’s
three-pronged approach85 would seem to encompass some extraterritorial actions,
and several commentators have made persuasive arguments for the inclusion of
“foreign-squared” ATS actions.86 This Note will argue that the United States has a

77. Id. at 1672 (“[A]t least one of the three kinds of activities that we found to fall within
the statute’s scope, namely piracy, normally takes place abroad.” (citation omitted)).
78. Id.
79. Id. Specifically, Breyer mentioned the “Barbary Pirates, the War of 1812, the sinking
of the Lusitania, and the Lockerbie bombing.” Id.
80. Id.
81. See generally Ralph G. Steinhardt, Determining Which Human Rights Claims “Touch
and Concern” the United States: Justice Kennedy’s Filartiga, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1695,
1703–04 (2014) (noting that the decision failed to offer “conclusive guidance” for cases
involving, for example, “U.S. nationals as defendants, conduct within the jurisdiction or
control of the United States or performed under contract with the U.S. government”).
82. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
83. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
84. See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669–70 (Alito, J., concurring); Steinhardt, supra note 81,
at 1705.
85. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
86. See Doug Cassel, Suing Americans for Human Rights Torts Overseas: The Supreme
Court Leaves the Door Open, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1773 (2014); Winkler, supra note 17, at
187–88; Alex S. Moe, Note, A Test by Any Other Name: The Influence of Justice Breyer's
Concurrence in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 46 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 225, 286–87 (2014).
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strong enough interest in allowing jurisdiction for claims arising in failed state
contexts to overcome the Court’s wariness in Kiobel.
Secondly, the Kiobel decision does not explicitly discuss Sosa’s or Filartiga’s
continued vitality. Roberts’s87 and Breyer’s88 opinions in Kiobel both cite Sosa
approvingly. Alito’s opinion would have applied the Sosa test only to domestic
conduct.89 However, the refusal of the other seven Justices to adopt the rationale
advanced by Justices Alito and Thomas is telling—the obvious implication is that
some foreign cases would be acceptable.90 Because this issue was not directly
addressed by any of the opinions, drawing definite conclusions is risky. However, at
the very least, it is possible to read the “touch and concern” language as
encompassing both Sosa and Filartiga.91 Despite the “foreign-cubed” fact patterns
in both cases, they arguably “touched and concerned” the United States to a sufficient
extent for jurisdiction.92 Finally, the “touch and concern” paragraph can, and perhaps
should, be read as dicta. Kennedy’s concurrence—representing the crucial fifth vote
for Roberts’s opinion—was careful to emphasize the narrow holding of Kiobel and
the possibility of different outcomes under other circumstances.93 Despite the
majority opinion’s sweeping language, there is ultimately little substance to guide
future applications of the ATS. Certainly, the presumption against extraterritoriality
and comity and foreign policy concerns highlighted by the Court will control in
future cases. However, as this Note will explore in the next several Parts, that
presumption and those concerns should be rebutted in certain circumstances.
Finally, the reasoning in all four opinions issued by the Kiobel Court framed the
issue around conceptions of sovereignty and territoriality, ideas which increasingly
carry different meaning and relevance than they did even as little as fifty years ago.94
Creative thinking is necessary to navigate this new world—one simultaneously made
smaller yet more complex by globalization.95 The world can no longer be
conceptualized as an intricate puzzle filled with interlocking jurisdictions.96 Rather,
transnational problems, relationships, and solutions are multifaceted, requiring
different levels and varieties of legal actors to work together. Trusting in the
traditional nation-state system to resolve the challenges posed by the globalizing
world, as the Court in Kiobel appeared to do, is problematic. Parts III and IV of this
Note will point out the inadequacy of traditional foreign policy and comity
approaches when applied to the failed-state context, thus demonstrating the

87. See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1663–65.
88. See id. at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring).
89. Id. at 1670 (Alito, J., concurring).
90. Steinhardt, supra note 81, at 1705.
91. Cassel, supra note 86, at 1784.
92. Id. Of course, jurisdiction was ultimately not found in Sosa, but that holding was
based on the lack of universality and specificity of the claim, not extraterritorial application.
See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004).
93. See supra text accompanying notes 70–71. See also Cassel, supra note 86, at 1787.
94. See Simon Roberts, After Government? On Representing Law Without the State, 68
MOD. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2005).
95. Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Hinskey Hills Lectures, Sailing to Globantium, 3–4 (Spring
2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Indiana Law Journal).
96. Id.
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inapplicability of the Kiobel Court’s primary concerns that led to applying the
presumption against extraterritoriality.97
II. ANALOGIZING PIRACY TO MODERN HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
IN FAILED STATES
There was a basic consensus among the Justices in Kiobel that piracy was
originally, and remains, a proper context for the application of the ATS. The Court’s
treatment of piracy in Kiobel was largely superficial—acknowledging that piracy
was a recognized violation of the law of nations at the time the ATS was passed. But
piracy was the only universal jurisdiction crime recognized by common law and the
law of nations.98 Exploring why, exactly, piracy was treated differently than other
kinds of crimes in the eighteenth century will provide context and guidance for
situations where the newly created presumption against extraterritorial application
should be rebutted. Specifically, the harms and jurisdictional problems caused by
human rights violations in failed states bear many similarities to those caused by
piracy.
A. Piracy as Understood at the Time of the ATS’s Passage
There was universal jurisdiction over piracy under the early law of nations.99
Although piracy’s heinous, universally condemned nature is the reason commonly
given for universal jurisdiction,100 a better explanation focuses on the characteristics
and impact of the activity.101 Piracy receives universal jurisdiction and condemnation
because of “its otherwise jurisdictionless nature, its threat to international commerce,
and the difficulty of policing it.”102 Professor Kontorovich has offered a nuanced
perspective on why piracy attained universal jurisdiction status, identifying six
characteristics of piracy that would need to be met for ATS jurisdiction to exist in
other contexts.103

97. Although exploring them is beyond the scope of this Note, the basic disconnect
between the state-centric, top-down sovereignty rationale in Kiobel and the rapidly changing
world is applicable to many other contexts as well, including antitrust efforts and labor rights.
98. Kontorovich, supra note 41, at 114.
99. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *71.
100. Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction’s Hollow
Foundation, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 183, 185–86 (2004).
101. Kontorovich, supra note 41, at 138. If heinousness is the only requirement, then a
potentially unlimited number of crimes could be subject to universal jurisdiction. Further, it is
unclear that piracy is really that heinous. Is “robbery at sea,” as piracy has been described,
more heinous than a garden-variety murder in Chicago? See Kontorovich, supra note 100, at
191, 205–07. Heinousness, of course, is certainly not a reason to disallow jurisdiction—it is
just not a sufficient reason by itself.
102. Recent Case, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1244, 1249 (2014) (citing United States v. Ali, 718
F.3d 929, 940 (D.C. Cir. 2013)).
103. Kontorovich, supra note 41, at 114–15.
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First, piracy was universally condemned by all nations.104 This requirement, also
made explicit in Sosa,105 is the most commonly identified. Second, piracy was
narrowly defined.106 This requirement was also read into ATS jurisprudence in Sosa,
articulated there as “specificity.”107 Third, piracy occurred on the high seas, outside
traditional jurisdictional nexuses.108 The limitations of traditional jurisdictional
constructs necessitate universal jurisdiction.109 Traditional jurisdiction’s inadequacy
is not necessarily limited to the high seas. For example, in United States v. Ali, the
District of Columbia Circuit affirmed universal jurisdiction over piracy when the
defendant’s alleged actions were “limited to acts he committed on land and in
territorial waters—not upon the high seas.”110 Notably, Ali was decided post-Kiobel.
Fourth, pirates were private actors—their actions did not represent official decisions
by a sovereign nation.111 Because official action is political action, providing
universal jurisdiction only for pirates acting privately avoided foreign policy and
comity concerns.112 Fifth, pirates were a global externality, posing an economic and
security threat to many nations.113 Piracy threatened international commerce and
navigation, things which all seafaring nations had a vested interest in protecting.114
Finally, piracy was subject to the same punishment in all jurisdictions—death.115

104. Id. at 139.
105. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725, 732 (2004).
106. Kontorovich, supra note 41, at 139–40.
107. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725.
108. Kontorovich, supra note 41, at 152.
109. Id. at 152–53; see also United States v. Caicedo, 47 F.3d 370, 372 (9th Cir. 1995)
(“Such vessels are ‘international pariahs.’ By attempting to shrug the yoke of any nation’s
authority, they subject themselves to the jurisdiction of all nations ‘solely as a consequence of
the vessel’s status as stateless.’” (emphasis in original) (citations omitted) (quoting United
States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373, 1382–83 (11th Cir. 1982))).
110. 718 F.3d 929, 932 (D.C. Cir. 2013). The defendant was being charged criminally
under a theory of aiding and abetting piracy, but the court still found that it would be
“self-defeating” to limit liability to conduct occurring on the high seas. Id. at 940. As the court
explained, the “high seas language refers to the very feature of piracy that makes it such a
threat: that it exists outside the reach of any territorial authority, rendering it both notoriously
difficult to police and inimical to international commerce.” Id.
111. Kontorovich, supra note 41, at 145–51.
112. See id. at 146–47.
113. Id. at 152–53.
114. Id. at 153.
115. Id. at 142–46. The key concerns here are forum shopping and double-jeopardy. Id. at
143. However, piracy is still a universal jurisdiction offense, yet there is no longer uniformity
in penalties for piracy. See generally Eugene Kontorovich, The Penalties for Piracy: An
Empirical Study of National Prosecution of International Crime (Northwestern University
School of Law, Faculty Working Papers, Paper No. 211, 2012), available at
http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1210&context
=facultyworkingpapers [https://perma.cc/P5JB-D5SU]. Thus, this characteristic seems an
inapposite requirement for modern applications of the ATS.
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B. Human Rights Violations in Failed States Create the Same Concerns as Piracy
In Kiobel, the Court made clear that the heinous nature of human rights violations,
when committed outside of the United States, does not ordinarily and by itself justify
jurisdiction.116 However, when the reasons for providing universal jurisdiction over
piracy are compared to those present in the failed state context,117 the similarities are
sufficient to rebut the presumption against extraterritorial application of the ATS.
First, the two requirements for jurisdiction articulated in Sosa do not necessarily
bar claims originating in failed states. Although Sosa’s requirements of universal
condemnation and specificity weeded out some ATS claims, many were still brought
and found to be within the federal courts’ jurisdiction.118 Further, failed states are
particularly susceptible to human rights violations, especially egregious violations
that would meet the Sosa requirements.119
Like pirate vessels, failed states do not fit naturally into normal conceptions of
sovereignty and jurisdiction. Unlike a strong, fully functioning state, failed states
cannot exercise sovereign power over their territory.120 The government’s legitimacy
is minimal, infrastructure is failing, and conflict is constant.121 South Sudan has been
consumed by civil war since December 2013.122 The conflict has ravaged
infrastructure, and the government has failed to demonstrate either the capacity or
the desire to protect its vulnerable citizens.123 Such states lack the ability to honor
international obligations or even engage in diplomatic relations with other states in a
coherent way.124 Thus, the failed state can be described as a mere “international legal
person without any substance to back its claim to statehood.”125 Like the high seas,
the territory which the failed state nominally controls is a jurisdictional dead zone.
Although, speaking in technical terms, that territory might still represent a legal
entity, the territory does not remain a legal jurisdiction for practical purposes.
Legitimate litigation or lawmaking from within is unfeasible. Piracy prosecutions
have no jurisdictional barriers because no single authority can police the high seas.
This same problem exists in failed states. Thus, as with piracy, the realities of the
situation necessitate universal jurisdiction.
Further, neither failed states nor piracy involves a legitimate actor making official
decisions. Rather, failed states involve the collapse of a government. Nonstate actors
dominate the territory because the government is no longer capable of offering

116. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1663–65 (2013).
117. See infra notes 144–50 and accompanying text for a definition of failed state.
118. Steinhardt, supra note 81, at 1700.
119. See generally Neil A. Englehart, State Capacity, State Failure, and Human Rights, 46
J. OF PEACE RES. 163 (2009).
120. John Yoo, Fixing Failed States, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 95, 100 (2011).
121. Id.
122. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2015, 495 (2015), available at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/wr2015_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/8FCM-JQJ6].
123. Id. at 500.
124. GM Ferreira, Good Governance and the Failed State, 41 COMP. & INT’L L.J. OF S.
AFR., 428, 435–36 (2008).
125. Id. at 436.
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protection.126 Self-proclaimed warlords, former government officials, and petty
criminals all prey on the population.127 For example, South Sudan is currently torn
between two ethnic factions, one supporting South Sudan’s president, and the other
supporting a former deputy of his.128 As with piracy, human rights violations in failed
states involve rogue actors preying on victims of opportunity. Further, providing
jurisdiction in the failed state context would largely avoid the foreign policy and
comity concerns on which the Kiobel Court was so fixated.129 Because the violations
do not involve official action by a sovereign state, the potential for political
embarrassment or controversy when providing jurisdiction to hear ATS claims is
greatly reduced.
Finally, the costs and harms imposed by human rights violations in failed states
impact many nations—they are a global externality. First, failed states are breeding
grounds for terrorist organizations, human trafficking, and smuggling of all
varieties.130 Each of those activities has a clear and direct impact on the greater
international community. Unchecked human rights abuses also result in floods of
refugees to surrounding states.131 Since the beginning of South Sudan’s civil war,
over 500,000 refugees have fled the country.132 Within South Sudan, another 1.5
million individuals have been displaced.133 Additionally, internal conflict and
lawlessness in a failed state can destabilize the surrounding region—violent radicals
might spread from the collapsed state to other states, ethnic conflict might draw in
related ethnic groups in other states, or surrounding states might feel the need to
increase their armament.134 Further, the developed community occasionally feels
morally compelled to intervene in areas where massive, sustained human rights
violations have proceeded unchecked.135 As already established, failed states are
exceedingly likely to serve as the backdrop for this kind of conduct.136 Surely, then,
the international community has an interest in providing redress for these claims
without needing to actually put humanitarian forces on the ground. Finally, and
perhaps most importantly, failed states—and especially those failed states gripped
by violence—impose significant economic costs on neighboring states.137 Just like

126. Robert I. Rotberg, Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and
Indicators, in STATE FAILURE AND STATE WEAKNESS IN A TIME OF TERROR 5–6 (Robert I.
Rotberg ed., 2003).
127. Id.
128. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 122, at 495.
129. See infra Part III.
130. Yoo, supra note 120, at 107.
131. Id.
132. U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., SOUTH SUDAN – CRISIS: FACT SHEET #5 (2015),
available at http://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/south_sudan_ce_fs05
_02-27-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/2SCR-JWKK].
133. Id.
134. Yoo, supra note 120, at 107–08.
135. Wayne Sandholtz, Humanitarian Intervention, in GLOBALIZATION AND HUMAN
RIGHTS, supra note 45, at 201, 211–12.
136. See supra text accompanying note 119.
137. Lisa Chauvet, Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler, The Cost of Failing States and the Limits
to Sovereignty (United Nations Univ. World Inst. for Dev. Econ. Research, Research Paper
No. 2007/30, 2007), available at http://www.diw.de/documents/dokumentenarchiv/17
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piracy imposed significant economic and security costs on all seafaring nations,
human rights violations in failed states are a global externality.138
In summary, the same reasons for creating universal jurisdiction for piracy
apply to human rights violations in failed states. The ATS provides jurisdiction for
piracy not only because of the heinousness of the crime, but more importantly
because the conduct cannot be adequately deterred otherwise. All nations have a
vested interest in stopping the conduct, but no one nation can do so alone. Likewise,
human rights abuses in failed states—at least those that are specific and heinous
enough to receive universal condemnation—cannot be rectified by reliance on
traditional jurisdictional concepts. The cost of these violations, both for the victims
and the international community, is extremely high. Further, by definition, these
abuses occur in a place where effective, legitimate governance is no longer occurring.
The failed states cannot be expected to provide adequate redress. Thus, conduct
occurring in failed states is one circumstance where the Kiobel presumption against
extraterritorial application should be rebutted.
III. PROVIDING JURISDICTION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS OFFENSES IN FAILED STATES
AVOIDS THE COMITY AND FOREIGN POLICY CONCERNS THE COURT
EMPHASIZED IN KIOBEL
Although the majority in Kiobel attempted to distinguish piracy from modern
human rights offenses, the majority’s reasoning in doing so was focused more on the
foreign policy and state sovereignty implications of providing jurisdiction for
extraterritorial conduct under the ATS.139 Certainly, unfettered ATS jurisdiction

/diw_01.c.346922.de/chauvet_conflict_gecc.pdf [https://perma.cc/9K7X-6KKE] (estimating
that the annual cost to neighbors of failed states is approximately $237 billion).
138. In this context, a failed state can be conceptualized as a kind of “commons”: like the
public field which offers potentially free grazing, the failed state offers potential for increased
economic growth and security for other states. See infra Subpart IV.A (detailing potential
benefits to the global order, and the United States specifically, which intervention in failed
states could produce). The analogy extends further: a “tragedy of the commons” occurs when
the self-interested ranchers overgraze the public field and destroy it; similarly, self-interested
states want to reinforce and comply with sovereignty norms because those norms usually help
produce political stability and economic growth, the same public goods the international
community wants from the failed state. However, refusal to intervene in the failed state only
exacerbates the economic and political externalities imposed by failed states. See infra text
accompanying notes 186–96 for a discussion of these externalities. In this way, the
international community’s blind reliance on sovereignty norms actually produces the opposite
effect as intended: instead of undergirding the economic and political order, it undermines it.
Thus, a “tragedy of the commons,” in a sense, occurs: the self-interested actions (or, here,
inaction) of the potential beneficiaries results in the loss of those potential benefits. However,
when some attempt is made to govern the commons, like extending ATS jurisdiction, the
international community will benefit, despite the potential weakening of sovereignty norms.
See generally ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS
FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990); Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE
1243, 1244–45 (1968).
139. See supra Part I.B.
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could result in awkward diplomatic situations.140 Expanding ATS jurisdiction could
create a precedent whereby U.S. citizens and officials were sued in foreign courts,
perhaps to make a political point.141 More specifically, the Supreme Court was
concerned with comity—a rule of construction that “cautions courts to assume that
legislators take account of the legitimate sovereign interests of other nations” so as
to ensure harmony between “potentially conflicting laws.”142 However, as will be
demonstrated, the implications and dangers of expanding ATS jurisdiction in the
failed state context are limited.
To this point, this Note has discussed common characteristics of failed states and
piracy.143 However, if the deciding factor for whether ATS jurisdiction exists is to be
whether the conduct occurred in a failed state, a working definition of what a failed
state is must be advanced.144 Because the Kiobel Court focused on traditional
concepts of comity, sovereignty, and foreign relations, the ability of a state to fulfill
those traditional state functions is most relevant.145 First, the state’s government must
be incapable of fulfilling its international obligations.146 Even though the state might
still technically exist as a legal entity, it must lack the ability to operate as a
nation-state in the international community.147 Second, the state must be unable to
ensure access to basic public services like public order, civil liberties, and, especially,
an impartial, functioning legal system.148 Of course, if the state is itself complicit in
the ongoing human rights violations, then it cannot provide a fair justice system.149
Finally, the state must have lost legitimacy domestically—whether from lack of
representativeness in the government, other groups claiming authority to govern,
corruption, or simple ineffectiveness.150

140. Cassel, supra note 86, at 1790.
141. Id. at 1791.
142. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164–65 (2004).
143. See supra Part II.
144. Unfortunately, there is no consensus on the precise definition of a failed state. Yoo,
supra note 120, at 100. Although there might be broad agreement on whether the most
dysfunctional states have failed, there is plenty of room for subjective judgment at the margins.
145. Nuanced definitions of “failed state” often focus more on the collapse of the social
contract with its citizens: economic decline, grossly inadequate public services, unresolved
group grievances, failure to respond to systemic challenges, and the like. See, e.g., THE FUND
FOR PEACE, supra note 2, at 10; Jean-Germain Gros, Towards a Taxonomy of Failed States in
the New World Order: Decaying Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda and Haiti, 17 THIRD WORLD Q.
455, 456 (1996).
146. Thomas D. Grant, Partition of Failed States: Impediments and Impulses, 11 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD., Summer 2004, at 51, 52. Examples of international obligations that
failed states would be unable to fulfill include treaty obligations and redress or prevention of
violations of international law by government actors and agencies. G.A. Res. 56/83, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/56/83 (Jan. 28, 2002).
147. Grant, supra note 146, at 52.
148. See THE FUND FOR PEACE, supra note 2, at 10 (encompassed in the “Public Services”
and “Human Rights and Rule of Law” categories).
149. Weinberg, supra note 17, at 1495 (“Our own basic civil rights law proceeds on the
theory that courts at the place of a governmental violation of human rights are not trustworthy
enforcers of the human rights of their own residents.”).
150. See THE FUND FOR PEACE, supra note 2, at 10 (encompassed in the “State Legitimacy”
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This working definition of a failed state provides an opportunity to determine
whether extending ATS jurisdiction to conduct originating in such states would
implicate the comity and foreign policy concerns identified by the Kiobel Court. The
next two subparts demonstrate that extending ATS jurisdiction in this limited context
would avoid the problems feared by the Court.
A. Comity and Failed States
When dealing with a failed state, comity is an inappropriate consideration. Failed
states, by definition, do not possess sovereign interests in the sense that a strong,
functional state does.151 Further, failed states are unable to provide adequate legal
remedies for domestic human rights violations. Thus, extending jurisdiction for
abuses occurring in failed states not only avoids comity concerns, but also is
necessary for any suitable remedy to occur.
The Court’s emphasis on the need for comity stems from its adherence to
traditional norms of sovereignty—the nation-state as a self-sufficient, autonomous
whole.152 There is serious debate over whether that conception of the world is, or
ever has been, truly accurate, especially once globalization’s impact is considered.153
And sovereignty does not exist in failed states.154 Failed states have, at best, a barely
functioning state apparatus.155 There is no central authority and the government, if
one still exists, has no monopoly on the legitimate use of force.156 Further,
lawmaking, if it occurs at all, is done by fiat, with scarcely a pretense of legitimate
procedure.157 Thus, allowing jurisdiction under the ATS would not undermine the
principle of comity—the failed state does not possess the institutional coherence or
legitimacy to meet traditional conceptions of sovereignty.
Additionally, the international community will occasionally intervene in failed
states to “halt large-scale human rights abuses.”158 When armed intervention occurs
in a failed state, the “sensitive sovereignty issue” is skirted, at least partially.159 As
Professor Sandholtz asserts, “In the post-Cold War era, there is an emerging sense

category); see also Stefan Mair, A New Approach: The Need To Focus on Failing States, 29
HARV. INT’L REV., Winter 2008, at 52, 52.
151. See supra notes 146–47 and accompanying text.
152. See Philip Liste, Transnational Human Rights Litigation and Territorialised
Knowledge: Kiobel and the ‘Politics of Space,’ 5 TRANSNAT’L LEGAL THEORY 1, 14–18
(2014).
153. See generally Richard L. Brinkman & June E. Brinkman, Globalization and the
Nation-State: Dead or Alive, 42 J. ECON. ISSUES 425 (2008); Sylvia Walby, The Myth of the
Nation-State: Theorizing Society and Polities in a Global Era, 37 SOCIOLOGY 529 (2003).
154. Anthony Vinci, Anarchy, Failed States, and Armed Groups: Reconsidering
Conventional Analysis, 52 INT’L STUD. Q. 295, 298–99 (2008); see also Sandholtz, supra note
135, at 221 (“Governments are able at least partially to skirt the sensitive sovereignty issue in
cases where intervention was carried out in states without a functioning government in control
of its territory . . . .”).
155. Ferreira, supra note 124, at 432–34.
156. Id.
157. See Rotberg, supra note 126, at 6–7.
158. Sandholtz, supra note 135, at 208.
159. Id. at 221.
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that when states engage in gross, systematic, or large-scale human rights abuses, they
thereby forfeit or suspend their status as sovereign equals in interstate society.”160
Surely, if failed states are lacking in sovereignty enough to justify actual
on-the-ground intervention, then allowing ATS jurisdiction would not violate
comity. Allowing private actors to bring civil actions in U.S. courts would appear to
be cheaper and potentially more effective than physical intervention.161
Secondly, failed states do not possess the means to provide legitimate domestic
legal remedies. In cases involving extraterritorial conduct, judges commonly wonder
why the case is not being brought where the cause of action originated.162 However,
obtaining legal redress in a failed state is not possible. When the local government
has lost its monopoly on the use of force and governmental institutions are corrupt
and grossly dysfunctional,163 the legal system, insofar as it exists, is completely
illegitimate.164 Often, ATS plaintiffs will have attempted to bring domestic claims
but cannot receive a fair hearing. In fact, this occurred in Filartiga.165 In other words,
victims in failed states that file a claim in the jurisdiction where the cause of action
originated do not have any real expectation of justice.
Further, the principle of exhaustion could serve as a limiting principle,
ensuring that ATS suits could not be brought by those who have an adequate
domestic legal remedy. The Sosa Court referenced this idea in a footnote.166 In
addition to the two explicit requirements the Court created for ATS jurisdiction,167
plaintiffs might also be required to show they “exhausted any remedies available in
the domestic legal system.”168 Beyond that open-ended footnote in Sosa, the Supreme
Court has not addressed the exhaustion issue in the ATS context. However, a number

160. Id. at 208.
161. See infra Part IV.B.
162. See, e.g., Transcripts of Oral Arguments, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133
S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10–1491); Transcript of Oral Argument, Morrison v. Nat’l Australia
Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010) (No. 08–1191). Justice Alito wondered what connection the
conduct in Kiobel had to the United States. Transcript of Feb. 28, 2012, Oral Argument at 7,
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10–1491). Justice Kennedy
voiced similar concerns during the second round of arguments in Kiobel. Transcript of Oct. 1,
2012, Oral Argument at 4, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No.
10–1491). Similarly, Justice Ginsburg observed in Morrison oral arguments that the case had
“‘Australia’ written all over it.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, Morrison v. Nat’l Australia
Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010) (No. 08–1191).
163. Ferreira, supra note 124, at 432–36.
164. See supra note 148–49 and accompanying text.
165. After the plaintiff filed a criminal action in Paraguayan courts, his attorney was
arrested and threatened with death. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980).
The attorney was later disbarred, allegedly without just cause. Id. At the trial, a son of one of
the defendant’s companions confessed to the murder, arguing it was a crime of passion. Id.
The plaintiffs alleged they had evidence which refuted that claim. Id. Regardless, the man who
confessed was never charged or convicted of any crime. Id. More importantly, the plaintiffs
had received no resolution from Paraguayan courts when the Filartiga decision was issued,
four years after the Paraguayan action was originally filed. Id.
166. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 n.21 (2004).
167. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
168. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733 n.21.
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of lower courts have considered whether exhaustion should be a requirement, with
courts divided over the correct approach.169 The wisdom of imposing an exhaustion
requirement is beyond the scope of this Note. However, exhaustion could certainly
serve as a safeguard—allowing ATS jurisdiction only when the domestic legal
system is too illegitimate to provide a remedy.170
B. The Foreign Policy Dangers of Extending Jurisdiction Have Been Exaggerated
In Kiobel, the justices also seemed concerned with the foreign policy implications
of extending jurisdiction.171 Because human rights abuses involve so many political
undertones, the Court was afraid that extending jurisdiction would interfere with the
foreign policy agendas of the executive or legislature.172 However, this concern,
especially when considered in the failed state context, has been overblown.
First, the atrocities that would be the subject of ATS suits are, by definition,
universally outlawed and reviled. Sosa clearly eliminated all ATS suits which might
be brought alleging conduct that is not recognized as a human rights violation.173
Controversial conduct, if not recognized as a human rights violation by the
international community’s consensus, would not be eligible under the ATS. No state,
failed or otherwise, is likely to have an “atrocity-favoring law.”174 Further, the United
States has an interest in affirming and upholding its commitment to human rights,
especially the particularly egregious variety to which the ATS is limited.175 As U.S.
Solicitor General Verrilli articulated to the Court during the Kiobel arguments: the
United States has “interests in ensuring that our Nation’s foreign relations
commitments to the rule of law and human rights are not eroded.”176 When
jurisdiction is limited only to conduct over which there is no dispute of wrongness,
and the executive branch itself is arguing for increased jurisdiction, foreign policy
concerns are minimal.
Second, because failed states are not engaging with the international community
on a meaningful level, the risk of foreign policy blowback is minimal. As already
established, failed states are legal entities in theory only—they do not possess the
institutional integrity or consistency to interact with the international community and
take on international obligations.177 As such, ATS suits are unlikely to disrupt

169. For a general summary of the cases and arguments involved, see Regina Waugh,
Exhaustion of Remedies and the Alien Tort Statute, 28 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 555, 564–69
(2010).
170. The exhaustion requirement contains a futility exception. Id. at 556. Thus, litigants
who would “face violent retaliation or even death for attempting to seek redress for their harms
in the local courts” would be protected. Id. at 557.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 56–59.
172. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013) (citing Sosa, 542
U.S. at 727).
173. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
174. Weinberg, supra note 17, at 1527.
175. Id. at 1529–30.
176. Transcript of Oct. 1, 2012, Oral Argument at 43–44, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10–1491).
177. See supra notes 146–47 and accompanying text.
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delicate negotiations between the United States and the failed state. There would be
no sovereign entity able to object to the exercise of jurisdiction in any coherent way.
The fact that providing jurisdiction for conduct occurring in functioning states would
provoke an international disturbance does not justify forbidding jurisdiction where
the foreign state does not—or cannot—object.178 Additionally, ATS suits involve a
civil suit brought by a private party. ATS suits do not constitute an official U.S.
action or judgment about the parties or territory where the suit originated.
Finally, there is no evidence that expanding the ATS jurisdiction, especially in
this limited setting, would result in retaliatory legislation or litigation. Although
Chief Justice Roberts appeared concerned with the possibility of retaliatory civil
actions against Americans,179 there is no evidence that such actions would be taken.
In fact, although Filartiga was decided in 1980, the Chief Justice was unable to
provide a single example of retaliation.180 Likely, no persuasive example exists.181
Rather, it seems the opposite is true: the international community perceives potential
jurisdiction under the ATS as admirable—an approach to be adopted.182 Such a view
is further supported by the fact that the U.S. government argued for a broader
conception of ATS jurisdiction in Kiobel.183 Finally, because failed states are
unlikely to possess the capability to coherently object to jurisdiction or engage in
retaliation, this concern is even more inapplicable.
IV. THE UNITED STATES’ INTEREST IN PROVIDING A MECHANISM FOR ADDRESSING
THESE VIOLATIONS
In contrast to the minimal comity and foreign policy concerns that extending
jurisdiction to failed states would raise, the United States has strong interests in
providing redress for the egregious human rights violations covered by the ATS. The
Unites States has a strong, recognized interest in human rights accountability
worldwide.184 Likewise, victims of gross human rights abuses have a recognized
right to access remedies185—an interest which has received little attention in this
debate. Those interests, however, are both relatively abstract. Extending ATS
jurisdiction to the failed state context would deliver more tangible benefits as well.
A. Providing Jurisdiction Would Align with U.S. Interests.
Human rights abuses in failed states are a global externality. As already
established, failed states are breeding grounds for terrorism and illegal trade.186
Sudan’s history of supporting terrorist organizations is long, predating South Sudan’s

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Cassel, supra note 86, at 1794–95.
See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013).
Weinberg, supra note 17, at 1491.
Id. at 1497.
Id. at 1502.
Id.
See supra text accompanying note 175; see also Cassel, supra note 86, at 1791.
Cassel, supra note 86, at 1791.
See supra text accompanying note 130.
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secession.187 The conflict in South Sudan has also resulted in increased elephant
poaching, illegal gold mining and smuggling, and arms smuggling.188 When the
political and institutional infrastructure of a state collapses, rogue actors thrive.189
This fact—the security threat posed by failed states—is often the justification given
for on-the-ground intervention.190 Certainly, then, allowing victims of human rights
abuses to bring suit in U.S. courts would be justified, if only as a more cost-effective
alternative. Failed states also impose significant financial costs on the rest of the
international community.191 The more the state is in turmoil, and the more its citizens
are experiencing major human rights abuses, the greater the cost to the rest of the
world.192 Further, the United States has an interest in developing the failed state
economically, if only as a market for U.S. goods and services.193 Because
globalization is tying the world’s markets together, all economic voids impact the
United States,194 and human rights violations are a major contributor to creating those
voids.195 Law and order are a prerequisite for economic growth, and it would be wise
to “extend the rule of law to those luckless places” that “struggle against violence,”
like failed states.196
Additionally, the United States has a strong, demonstrated commitment to rule of
law and human rights. As previously mentioned, the U.S. Solicitor General
highlighted this interest during the Kiobel arguments.197 In his concurrence, Justice
Breyer also emphasized this interest.198 Further, the United States has codified its
intention to “promote and encourage increased respect for human rights and

187. Jonathan Schanzer, Pariah State: Examining Sudan’s Support for Terrorism, DEFEND
DEMOCRACY (July 5, 2012), http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/pariah-state
-examining-sudans-support-for-terrorism/ [https://perma.cc/G5JP-KXUY].
188. Keith Somerville, What Is Driving the Demise of the African Elephant?, POLITICSWEB
(Dec. 11, 2014), http://www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-analysis/what-is-driving-the
-demise-of-the-african-elephant [https://perma.cc/9T8R-PNQ6]; South Sudan Loses over
$200m a Year from Gold Smuggling, SUDAN TRIB. (July 29, 2013),
http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article47474 [https://perma.cc/5BEB-DWW9];
Judith Van Der Merwe, The Crime-Terror Continuum: The Case of Africa, ABERFOYLE INT’L
SECURITY (Jan. 2, 2014), http://www.aberfoylesecurity.com/?p=778 [https://perma.cc/L7GH
-A5XD].
189. Vinci, supra note 154, at 299.
190. Sandholtz, supra note 135, at 212.
191. See Chauvet et al., supra note 137, at 12–13 (“[F]ailing states are costly primarily
because they inflict externalities on others.”).
192. See id. at 10–11.
193. See Ellen L. Frost, Economic Globalization: Stability or Conflict?, in STRATEGIC
ASSESSMENT 1999: PRIORITIES FOR A TURBULENT WORLD 19, 22 (Hans Binnendijk et al. eds.,
1999).
194. See id. at 32.
195. See Chauvet et al., supra note 137, at 3–9.
196. Weinberg, supra note 17, at 1490–91.
197. See supra text accompanying note 176.
198. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1674 (2013) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (arguing that “we should treat this Nation’s interest in not becoming a safe harbor
for violators of the most fundamental international norms as an important jurisdiction-related
interest”).
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fundamental freedoms throughout the world.”199 For the last forty years, presidential
administrations have confirmed the United States’ commitment to human rights.200
Finally, expanding the ATS would increase U.S. soft power. Soft power—the
United States’ “ability to attract others by the legitimacy of U.S. policies and the
values that underlie them”201—is an integral part of the United States’ status as a
world power.202 Furthermore, soft power must be cultivated and developed
intentionally.203 According to Professor Weinberg, “American alien tort litigation
surely advances America’s moral standing and authority in the world.”204 Providing
victims of horrific crimes an avenue to air their grievances and achieve justice fits
naturally with American ideals and is likely to be met with admiration and imitation
internationally.205
B. Providing Jurisdiction Would Strengthen Protection of Human Rights
in Failed States
Of course, even if the United States has strong interests in deterring human rights
abuses and providing redress for those that have occurred, extending jurisdiction is
useless unless it would further those interests. One might object: What good would
a verdict in favor of the victims do? Even if the hopes of collecting damages are
small, however, extending jurisdiction is still worthwhile.
First, expanding the ATS to cover the failed state context would strengthen
international human rights norms. Merely by existing, the ATS expresses
condemnation of acts that are particularly egregious.206 Victims in failed states are
among the most marginalized of all human rights victims.207 Because they have no
domestic recourse, and likely lack the resources or institutions to organize and gain
political attention, they are often without a forum to voice their grievances.208 The
ATS provides a forum. Merely by shedding light on groups that might otherwise
languish in the shadows, the ATS legitimizes and vindicates the victims.

199. 22 U.S.C § 2304(a)(1) (2012).
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203. See generally id. at 18–19.
204. Weinberg, supra note 17, at 1504.
205. Id. at 1502, 1504.
206. William S. Dodge, Alien Tort Litigation: The Road Not Taken, 89 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1577, 1593 (2014).
207. See Charles W. Brower II, Note, Calling All NGOs: A Discussion of the Continuing
Vitality of the Alien Tort Statute as a Tool in the Fight for International Human Rights in the
Wake of Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 26 WHITTIER L. REV. 929, 950 (2005). The Kiobel decision
only serves to further disenfranchise persecuted minorities. See Ivana Isailovic, Reframing the
Kiobel Case: Political Recognition and State Jurisdiction, 38 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV.
1, 7 (2015) (“The decision thereby entrenches processes of socio-economic
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Further, litigation is an effective method for ending human rights abuses. Because
human rights abuse victims are generally disenfranchised, attempts to gain redress
through political solutions often go nowhere.209 Consequently, allowing private
parties, with the aid of nongovernmental organizations, to bring private civil suits
against abusers have been, comparatively, quite effective.210 First of all, the ATS
places the power to bring suit in the victim’s hands. Instead of waiting and hoping
that outside governments will take notice and act to stop the violations, the victims
are empowered to take action themselves.211 ATS suits expose human rights abusers,
often serving as a public, legal record that the violation occurred.212 Additionally,
they challenge the culture of impunity which often exists in failed states, provide
survivors with a forum for speaking out, deter future abuses,213 and ensure that the
United States will not give safe haven to human rights abusers.214 At the very least,
upon entry of a judgment in favor of a plaintiff, the defendant’s freedom to enter the
United States is severely limited because the defendant’s assets could be seized by a
court.215
C. Anatomy of an ATS Suit
Thus far, this Note has focused on the threshold issue in ATS cases: jurisdiction.
If the suit cannot be properly brought in U.S. courts, then the inquiry goes no further.
However, the hurdles for ATS plaintiffs do not end once jurisdiction is established.
Because an ATS suit, especially one involving foreign parties and conduct
originating in a failed state, is different from typical domestic tort law suits, one
might wonder about the mechanics of the action: Who brings the suit? What is the
cause of action? What kind of remedies might result?216 Although robust answers to
these questions are far beyond the scope of this Note, providing a brief outline of the
contours of an ATS suit is helpful. Courts have struggled over these issues, but many
ATS suits have been successfully litigated regardless.217
ATS actions originate when a plaintiff decides to bring suit in a U.S. court.
Although victims of human rights violations often decide to bring suit without
prompting, international human rights organizations often seek out and work with
victims—offering advice and resources—to find plaintiffs for ATS suits.218 The ATS
is solely a jurisdictional statute, so it does not provide a cause of action.219 However,
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courts have recognized a number of violations of the law of nations that meet Sosa’s
requirements of universal condemnation and specificity.220 In order to properly
establish personal jurisdiction, a party will often have to wait to serve the defendant
until the defendant appears in the United States.221 Because of this, even the threat of
a suit can constrain the freedom of a potential defendant to travel, resulting in a small
victory for victims. Successful ATS actions result in monetary damage awards,222
although the suits create other benefits as well.223 Although satisfying all these
procedural barriers might be challenging for actions originating in failed states, it can
be done.224 Extending ATS jurisdiction to include actions originating in failed states
would not be a futile gesture.
Take, as the setting for a hypothetical ATS suit, a multinational corporation with
a presence in a state that has collapsed around the company.225 Should that
corporation engage in conduct that violates the Sosa requirements—basically the
erga omnes and jus cogens offenses226—no local authorities would be in a position,
even if they wanted, to provide a remedy. In that case, under extended ATS
jurisdiction, nongovernmental organizations could work with victims to bring claims
in U.S. courts.227 Because of its international presence, serving the company would
be relatively straightforward, as would obtaining a monetary remedy, should the suit
be successful.228 Victims would receive compensation and vindication, the company
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would be penalized for its actions and motivated to stabilize troubled states in which
it has holdings, and the international human rights framework would be strengthened.
D. Statutory Reform as an Alternative to Jurisprudential Reform
Although this Note has focused on the Court’s reasoning in Kiobel and suggested
a situation where the reasons and concerns for applying a presumption against
extraterritorial application should be rebutted, the reasons to provide ATS
jurisdiction in the failed state context are strong enough to justify legislative action.
After Filartiga, Congress passed the Torture Victim Protection Act, which provides
a federal cause of action for victims of torture or extrajudicial killings.229 That Act’s
legislative history demonstrated Congress’s intent to endorse and broaden the
Filartiga holding.230 In Kiobel’s wake, Congress should once again weigh in, this
time amending the ATS to exempt actions originating from conduct in failed states
from the presumption against extraterritorial application. Rather than using the term
“failed state,” which is subject to various definitions, Congress should focus on the
inadequacy of domestic remedies. If a state’s political and legal infrastructure is too
dysfunctional to provide a fair hearing, the United States’ interests in providing a
forum outweigh the concerns behind the presumption against extraterritoriality.
CONCLUSION
According to many commentators, the Kiobel decision sounded the death knell
for ATS human rights litigation.231 If that proves to be the case, it would be troubling.
The United States has strong interests in providing a forum and means of redress for
foreign victims of egregious human rights abuses. Even if a suit does not directly
impact the United States, the United States is hardly a disinterested bystander.
In Kiobel, the Justices raised concerns about sovereignty and foreign policy. The
analysis in Kiobel was very territorial—premised on the traditional idea that
nation-states are sovereign actors, each autonomous and self-sufficient. However,
globalization is rendering that conception of the international order outdated. Even
if the nation-state is still the predominant entity in the international system, it cannot
be used to describe all territories.
This Note has argued that the failed state is one such example. Because failed
states lack the institutional structure or legitimacy to fulfill traditional conceptions of
sovereignty, and are too ineffective to coherently engage in foreign policy, the
primary concerns identified in Kiobel are inapposite. Further, victims in failed states
are both numerous and very likely to lack legitimate options for redress. Thus,
reformation of the ATS is needed, and it could be achieved either through the
judiciary or the legislature. Extending ATS jurisdiction to encompass conduct
originating in failed states would serve U.S. interests, avoid foreign policy or comity
complications, and vindicate disenfranchised victims.
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